Flight consisting of a single booking and divided into more legs. The Court of Justice rules on the concept of “place of performance of the obligation in question”
On 3 February 2022, the Court of Justice handed down its judgment in Case C‑20/21, JW, HD, XS v LOT Polish Airlines, on the interpretation of the second indent of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012. The request has been made in proceedings between three passengers, JW, HD and XS, and LOT Polish Airlines (“LOT”) concerning the payment of compensation in respect of a delayed flight.
JW, HD and XS made a single booking with Lufthansa AG for a flight from Warsaw to Malé with a connection in Frankfurt am Main, whose first leg was operated by LOT. Due to delayed departure, however, the three passengers landed late in Frankfurt-am-Main and missed their connecting flight to Malé, reaching their final destination after a delay of more than four hours. Therefore, they requested that the Amtsgericht Frankfurt (Local Court of Frankfurt) order LOT to pay each of them compensation of EUR 600.
Since the court rejected that request as inadmissible, the three passengers brought an appeal before the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main (Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main; the “referring court”) who, in light of the need to interpret the relevant European legislation, decided to stay the proceedings and to ask the Court of Justice whether the second indent of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that, in respect of a flight consisting of a confirmed single booking for the entire journey and divided into two or more legs on which transport is performed by separate air carriers, where a claim for compensation, brought on the basis of Regulation No 261/2004, arises from a delay of the first leg of the journey caused by a late departure and is brought against the air carrier operating that first leg, the place of arrival of that first leg can also be classified as a ‘place of performance’ within the meaning of that provision.
According to the Court, where there are several places at which services are provided in different Member States, the place of performance must be understood as that with the closest connecting factor between the contract and the court having jurisdiction, which, as a general rule, will be at the place of the main provision of services that must be deduced, as far as possible, from the provisions of the contract itself. Despite, in relation to a direct flight operated between two Member States by the airline with which the passenger concerned has a contractual relationship, the place of arrival and that of departure of the aircraft must be considered, in the same respect, as the place of provision of the services which are the subject of an air transport contract, in the present case the referring court does not indicate the elements of the contract which could justify the existence of a sufficiently close link between the facts of the dispute and its jurisdiction. Therefore, the “place of performance” can be that of departure of the first leg of the journey as one of the places of the main provision of services that are the subject of the contract of carriage by air at issue.
Marco Stillo